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I. INTRODUCTION
This article began as a presentation on interjurisdictional
watershed management. "Interjurisdictional" is really just verbiage. A
watershed, defined by physical rather than political boundaries, rarely
falls under the management of a single entity. The land area that
drains to a single body of water such as a river or lake is the watershed
itself.' Also, a few acres may drain to a small stream or wetland while
those small streams and wetlands may drain into larger rivers, which in
turn drain into estuaries. 2 Watershed management, therefore, "uses
t Kara Gillon is Wildlife Counsel with Defenders of Wildlife, a biodiversity

advocacy organization based in Washington, D.C., with a field office, inter alia, in
Albuquerque, NM. Since 1994, Defenders has embarked on a legal, scientific and
political strategy to protect and conserve the Sonoran Desert ecosystem, including that
oasis which is the Lower Colorado River and Delta. Ms. Gillon is also a participant in
the Middle Rio Grande ESA Collaborative Program.
1. This has become the popular definition, as the U.S.G.S. defines watershed as
The divide separating one drainage basin from another and in the past has

been generally used to convey this meaning. However, over the years, use of
the term to signify drainage basin or catchment area has come to
predominate, although drainage basin is preferred .... Used alone, the
term "watershed" is ambiguous and should not be used unless the intended
meaning is made clear.
W.B. LANGBEIN & KATHLEEN T. ISERI, GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND HYDROLOGIC
DEFINITIONS, GEOLOGICAL SURVEY WATER-SUPPLY PAPER 154-A (1995), available at

http://water.usgs.gov/wsc/glossary.html. This article will refer to basin-"A part of
the surface of the earth that is occupied by a drainage system, which consists of a

surface stream or a body of impounded surface water together with all tributary
surface streams and bodies of impounded

surface water"-interchangeably with

watershed. Id.
2.

See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PROTECTING AND RESTORING AMERicA's
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hydrologically defined areas (watersheds) to coordinate the
management of water resources" as well as "all activities within a
landscape that affect watershed health."3 One look at a topographic
map of North America can tell you that virtually any comprehensive
watershed management is by definition interjurisdictional.
But imagine if it were not. In 1890, John Wesley Powell, then
director of the United States Geological Survey, suggested that the
federal government organize the western United States into
watersheds. Powell drafted a map that divided the lands west of the
hundredth meridian into twenty-four river basins, which were further
divided into approximately 150 watershed units.4 Each watershed unit
would be a self-governing body.' As we can see, Congress did not
West.
realize Powell's vision, and "desert islands" dot the
Two major rivers of the American West-the Colorado and the Rio
Grande-are prime examples of the clash between Powell's vision and
our reality. The Colorado River serves Los Angeles, San Diego,
Denver, Salt Lake City and tens of other cities that lie outside of the
river's watershed . The river has even been engineered to direct a
portion of its flow to the Rio Grande. Moreover, early compacts
divided these rivers to measure and enforce water deliveries,
continually partitioning the basins, 8 and leading to the peculiar
phenomena of prohibiting water flow within a river simply because it
would move from an upper to a lower basin.9
Renewed emphasis on watershed management faces the challenges
left by centuries-old fragmentation of the watershed. 0 Since Powell
(2001),
availableat http://www.epa.gov/owow/protecting/.
3. Id. at 10.
4. Alex Philp, John Wesley Powell's Watershed Commonwealths: Mapping a West that

WATERSHEDS: STATUS, TRENDS, AND INITIATIVES IN WATERSHED MANAGEMENT 9

Might Have Been, CASCADIA PLANET, (1998) (citing UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY,
ARID REGION

OF THE UNITED

STATES, SHOWING DRAINAGE DISTRICTS,

ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT, 1889-1890, PART II, IRRIGATION

PL., LXIX,

(1891),

available at
http://www.tnews.com/text/powell-story.html.
5. Id.
6. See Todd Wilkinson, Roman Aquaducts of New West: Water Pipes, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, May 3, 2001.

7. See MILTON N. NATHANSON, UPDATING THE HOOVER DAM DOCUMENTS 1 (1978)
(population of 2.5 million within the basin, but twelve million receive some portion of
their water supply from the Colorado River).
8. The Colorado River is divided at Lee Ferry into an Upper and Lower Basin, not

inclusive of Mexico. Colorado River Compact, 123 Colo. Sess. Laws 684, COLO. REV.
STAT. § 37-61-101 to 104 (2001). The Rio Grande is commonly divided into four
reaches: Upper Rio Grande (within Colorado); Middle Rio Grande (Colorado/New
Mexico state line to Elephant Butte Reservoir); Paso del Norte (Elephant Butte to
Presidio Dam, "the Forgotten Reach"); and Lower Basin (Presidio to Gulf of Mexico).
William A. Paddock, The Rio Grande Compact of 1938, 5 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 1, 4-10

(2001).
9. See David

J. Guy, When the Law Dulls the Edge of Chance: TransferringUpper Basin

Water to the Lower Colorado River Basin, 1991 UTAH L. REV. 25 (1991).
10. See generally A. Dan Tarlock, PuttingRivers Back in the Landscape: The Revival of
Watershed Management in the United States, 6 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVrL. L. & POL'Y 167

(2000).
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first drew his map, the lands of the West have been divided among
cities, states, and countries rather than connected to streams, lakes,
and rivers. The United States has developed separate laws for clean
water, clean air, endangered species, irrigated agriculture, and land
use management, for implementation at the federal level." Each of
the western states has developed similar, yet diverse, laws governing
the allocation and use of water rights, administration of groundwater
resources, and wildlife management. 2 Separate agencies administer
these laws at federal, state, and tribal levels. 3 Each entity has different
missions, authorities, and modes of operation.
What we are left with is a patchwork of statutes that recognize
jurisdictions of state, federal and tribal agencies regarding countless
issues affecting a watershed. Where these authorities overlap, it is
often difficult for governmental entities to cooperate and share power
among themselves as well as the regulated community. Where issues
arise that do not fall squarely within existing structure, it is difficult for
these entities to cross political and historical boundaries. Therefore,
watershed initiatives must overcome fragmented, incomplete and
shared regulatory schemes-existing among and within different levels
of government.
Because property and political boundaries of
countries, states, tribes, counties, and municipalities are largely
unrelated to watersheds, stakeholders have found it4 difficult to
coordinate watershed protection and restoration efforts.
The Colorado River and the Rio Grande provide a fascinating case
study of the interplay of political boundaries and watersheds in
resource management. Both rivers' headwaters are in Colorado, in the
Rocky Mountains and San Juan Mountains, respectively, both head
south collecting water from tens of tributaries, and both form part of
our border with Mexico. Political boundaries have not respected
geographic ones, and the contradiction has generated Congressional
enactments, Supreme Court decisions, interstate compacts, and
international treaties.'" Despite the fact that these rivers supply water
11. See, e.g., Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. § 661 (2000);
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2000); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 12511387 (1994); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7671 (1994). Land use management also
encompasses the watershed concept, see Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 528 (2000); National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1600 (2000); Federal Land
Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1701-1785 (1994) (commanding the Forest
Service, 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e), (g) (3), and Bureau of Land Management, 43 U.S.C. §
1702(c) to consider the watershed in its land use plans and multiple use decisions).
12. See generally UNrrED STATES DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, THE NATURE
CONSERVANCY,

PRESERVING OUR NATURAL

HERITAGE,

VOLUME

II

STATE AcTVITIES

(1978).
13. Several statutes provide that qualifying Tribes be treated as states in
implementing parts of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e); Safe Drinking Water
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300h-l(e); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7474(e).
14. For a discussion on whether watershed initiatives are practicable or preferable,
see Robert W. Adler, Addressing the Barriers to Watershed Protection, 25 ENVrL. L. 973
(1995); see also BETSY RIEKE & DOUG KENNEY, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AT THE
WATERSHED LEVEL (1997).

15.

Both rivers live and die according to each's "Law of the River." The Law of the
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to two of the fastest growing regions in the world, there has been little
ecological coordination between the two countries. Rather than
allowing the watersheds to serve as boundaries, the rivers themselves
do, and the international border severs both basins. 16 Adding insult to
injury, the United States federal government has further scorned the
watersheds of the two rivers by turning the Colorado River into a
tributary of the Rio Grande, diverting approximately 110,000 acre-feet
of water from a Pacific watershed to an Atlantic one, each year."
This article will first discuss in more detail the multitudinous
obligations of federal, state, and tribal entities under the patchwork of
laws and jurisdictions currently governing the majority of operations
on the Lower Colorado River and Middle Rio Grande. The next
section will examine several tangible examples of the overlap and gaps
created by the exercise of these authorities and the fulfillment of these
obligations. The last section will describe existing river restoration
efforts in the two basins and their ability to overcome these obstacles
and achieve watershed management and protection.
II. PATCHWORK OF EXISTING STATUTES AND AUTHORITIES
THAT RECOGNIZE JURISDICTIONS OF FEDERAL, TRIBAL, AND
STATE AGENCIES.
When dealing with river basins, the landmark Clean Water Act
("CWA") sets the stage." The CWA sets out to "restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters"
and establishes national goals to achieve such: the elimination of "the
discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters;" the prohibition of
"the discharge of toxic pollutants;" and "water quality which provides
for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and
provides for recreation in and on the water."1 9
In general, the CWA institutes various regulatory structures to
achieve these goals. First, the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") must set effluent limits based on what is technologically and
economically feasible for hundreds of pollutants for categories of
dischargers. 0 At the same time, states must set ambient water quality
Colorado River is the subject of lawsuits as well as novels. See, e.g., MARC REISNER,
CADILLAc DESERT (1993) (general history of federal, state, and private water
development).
16. See Multi-Species Conservation Program (MSCP) for the Lower Colorado River,
Arizona, Nevada and California, 64 Fed. Reg. 27,000, 27,001 (May 18, 1999) (calling
the MSCP a "comprehensive conservation approach" for the Lower Basin, to the
Southerly International Boundary).
17. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON,

CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN, LAND, WATER AND THE

FUTURE OF THE WEST 222 (1992). The waters of the Navajo, Little Navajo and Blanco
Rivers, which would flow west into the San Juan and then into the Colorado, are sent
instead into the Azotea Tunnel and transported across the Continental Divide to
Azotea Creek, a tributary of the Rio Chama in the Rio Grande watershed, which drains
into the Gulf of Mexico. Id.
18. 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1387 (1994).
19. Id. § 1251(a).
20. 1& § 1311.
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standards for the receiving waters.2 ' Dischargers must obtain a permit
that certifies the discharged pollutant(s) satisfy both the effluent
limitations and the water quality standards.'
The process of setting water quality standards is where the
watershed itself comes into play. To establish the standards, states
must first inventory all state waters and identify those not protected by
EPA-set effluent limits. 2 1

State standards divide the waters into

segments, determine the present and attainable uses for each segment
(endangered species, recreation, domestic use, etc.), and set numeric
21
limits on pollutants that will protect these uses.
In addition to setting water quality standards, states are required to
assign the "total maximum daily load" ("TMDL") for water bodies that
do not meet existing water quality standards. 2' TMDLs are, in effect, a
"pollution budget" among both point and nonpoint sources of
pollution. 26 The key elements of an EPA regulatory strategy for
dealing with the vast number of polluted waterbodies call for
identification of polluted waterbodies, of pollutants and their sources,
and a quantification of a pollutant load.2 ' The allocations may require
land use controls for nonpoint sources of pollution since technological
control of point sources have not satisfied state standards.2 ' A bill
introduced into the Senate in 1994 included a title on watershed
planning, in part to address the contentious issue of nonpoint source
pollution.29

21. Id. § 1313. If state law is absent or insufficient, the EPA will promulgate water
quality standards. Id. § 1313(a) (3) (C).
22. The EPA, or a state, if delegated federal permitting authority through an
acceptable program, may issue "a permit for the discharge of any pollutant." Id. §
1342(a)(1). A tribe may also issue discharge permits. Id. § 1377(e). Furthermore, if
existing water quality is better than state water quality standards, discharges may not be
permitted if they degrade the water to meet the standards-the antidegradation
requirement. Id. § 1313(d) (4) (B).
23. Id. § 1313(d)(1)(A).
24. 40 C.F.R. § 131.2 (2001).
25. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (1994).
26. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Water, Final TMDL
Rule:
Fulfilling
the
Goals
of
the
Clean
Water
Act,
at
http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/finalrule/factsheetl.html. The fact sheet also notes
that over 20,000 waterbodies in the United States have been identified as polluted,
including 300,000 river and shoreline miles and five million acres of lakes.
27. See Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and
Revisions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in Support
of Revisions to Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg.
43,586 (July 13, 2000). However, this rule acknowledged the EPA's inability to
implement the TMDL rule until October 31, 2001, id. at 43,660, and has since
postponed implementation until April 30, 2003. Effective Date of Revision to the
Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 66 Fed. Reg. 53,044 (Oct. 18,
2001).
28. See generally Oliver A. Houck, The Clean Water Act TMDL Program:Law, Policy, and
Implementation, 32 ENVrL. L. RPTR. 10,358 (2002).
29. S. 2093, 103d Cong. (1994). As of this writing, the Bush administration and
EPA announced a request of $21 million for fiscal year 2003 for watershed protection
for the same purposes. John Heilprin, EPA Plans Watershed ProtectionProgram, WASH.
PoST, Jan. 28, 2002, at Al9.
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In contrast, the Endangered Species Act's role in protecting
ecosystems has united stakeholders, resource managers and
enforcement agencies in an effort to protect and recover endangered
species in a river basin. While the trigger is usually endangered
aquatic species, such efforts to protect the species have the potential to
expand their scope to riparian and terrestrial species. 30
Congress passed the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") in order to
"provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered
species and threatened species depend may be conserved, [and] to
provide a program for the conservation of such [] species."3 The ESA
contains procedural and substantive requirements that serve to carry
out the conservation and recovery goals of the Act, including the
development of recovery plans, the duty to conserve listed species, the
duty to avoid jeopardizing listed species via consultation with the Fish
and Wildlife Service or National Marine Fisheries Service, and the
prohibition on taking listed species.
In order to trigger these
protections, the services must list species as threatened or endangered
and designate the critical habitat of that species.3
Once listed, it is illegal for anyone to "take" an endangered or
threatened species.34
The federal government has additional
obligations: to utilize their authorities and carry out programs for the
conservation of listed species, and to ensure that any action they
authorize, fund, or carry out is not likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of any federally listed species or result in the destruction or
adverse modification, of designated critical habitat.35 In the event that
a federal agency determines that its action "may affect" a listed species
or designated critical habitat, the agency is required to consult with
the Fish and Wildlife Service regarding the degree of impact and
30. For more detail, see infra note 180 and accompanying text (discussing the initial
impetus behind the Lower Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation Program and its
eventual scope).

31.

16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2000) (emphasis added).

32.

Id. §§ 1533(f) (recovery plans), 1536(a)(1) (duty to conserve), 1536(a)(2)

(duty to consult), 1538 (taking).
33.

See id. § 1533(a). An endangered species is defined as "any species which is in

danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range." Id.
§ 1532(6). While the Act requires designation of critical habitat to occur concurrently
with listing, this rarely occurs. In fact, the Service often designates critical habitat only
after a court decision mandating such. See DEFENDERS

OF WILDLIFE, CONSERVATION IN
ActiON: SAFEGUARDING CITIZEN RIGHTS UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES Acr (2001).

34. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B); 50 C.F.R. § 17.21(a), (c), 17.31 (2001). The term
"take" is broadly defined to include "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill,
trap, capture, or collect, or... attempt to engage in any such conduct." 16 U.S.C.
§ 1532(19). The FWS has further defined "harm" to include "significant habitat
modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife" and "harass" to
include activities that disrupt normal behavioral patterns, including but not limited to,
breeding, feeding or sheltering. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3.
35. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (1)-(2). 'Jeopardize the continued existence of [a species]
means to engage in an action that reasonably would be expected, directly or indirectly,
to reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a listed
species in the wild by reducing the reproduction, numbers, or distribution of that
species." 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.
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measures available to avoid or minimize the adverse effects."6
In addition, pursuant to the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act
("FWCA"), the Fish and Wildlife Service, National Marine Fisheries
Service, and state wildlife agencies must review federal water projects
that may impound, divert, or otherwise modify a waterbody for the
impacts to wildlife "with a view to the conservation of wildlife resources
by preventing loss of and damage to such resources."37 While the
consultation process under the FWCA may not stop a project, the Act
does extend to fish and wildlife not covered by the ESA.s
Naturally, the most encompassing federal obligation originates
from the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA")-"our basic
national charter for protection of the environment."3 9 Its purpose is to
"promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the
environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of
man,"40 and to "help public officials make decisions that are based on
understanding of environmental consequences, and take actions that
protect, restore and enhance the environment.",4
In one way or
another, these watershed efforts will undergo NEPA analyses.
Section 102 of NEPA contains action-forcing provisions, aimed at
fulfilling NEPA's intent, that require all federal agencies to prepare an
environmental impact statement for "major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment," that
includes "the environmental impact of the proposed action," "any
adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided," and
"alternatives to the proposed action."4 2 Without these provisions,
public participation would be less meaningful.43
Development of alternatives to the proposed action is the heart of
the EIS. 44 The Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ") regulations
call on federal agencies to "[r]igorously explore and objectively
evaluate all reasonable alternatives ..... [d] evote substantial treatment
to each alternative considered in detail including the proposed action
so that reviewers may evaluate their comparative merits[,]
....[i]nclude the alternative of no action ....[and] [i]nclude
appropriate mitigation45measures not already included in the proposed
action or alternatives."

36. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)-(b).
37. Id § 662(a).
38. See itd§ 661 (declaring a purpose of the Act to provide "that wildlife
conservation shall receive equal consideration and be coordinated with other features
of water-resource development programs .....
39. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a) (2001).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994).
41. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
43. See Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139,
143 (1981) (NEPA fully informs the public of environmental effects and facilitates
public input into the decision-making process).
44. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14.
45. Id. § 1502.14.

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 5

The environmental consequences section of the EIS "forms the
scientific and analytic basis" for the comparison of alternatives.46 This
section discusses the direct and indirect effects of the alternatives, the
significance of the environmental effects, and the means to mitigate
adverse impacts. 7 Once an action is considered to have significant
impact, mitigation measures must be developed where it is feasible to
do so.4
In a discussion of western watersheds, the Reclamation Act may
have left a greater legacy than any environmental law.
Local
irrigation interests did not have the capital to build and sustain private
irrigation projects; federal resources were required for the widespread
irrigation envisioned in the arid west." The Reclamation Act hastened
settlement and irrigation of the federally owned desert; since then, the
Bureau of Reclamation alone has built 133 water projects in the
western United States 5'
Under the Reclamation Act, Congress restricted the use of water
delivered by federal projects to that reasonably needed for beneficial
use." Many states have similar rules, as one court observed:
water is too valuable to be wasted, either through an extravagant
application for the purpose appointed or by waste by misapplication
which can be avoided by the exercise of a reasonable degree of care
to prevent loss, or loss of a53volume which isgreatly disproportionate
to that actually consumed."

46. Id. § 1502.16.
47. Id. Direct effects are caused by the action and occur at the same time and
place, indirect effects are"
[C]aused by the action and are later in time or farther removed in distance,
but are still reasonably foreseeable. Indirect effects may include growth
inducing effects and other effects related to induced changes in the pattern
of land use, population density or growth rate, and related effects on air and
water and other natural systems, including ecosystems.
Id. § 1508.8.
48. Id. §§ 1502.14(0, 1502.16(h), 1508.14.
49. Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. §§ 331-616 (1994)) (establishing the purpose of Bureau of Reclamation to
construct and operate irrigation facilities in the sixteen arid western states).
50. The All-American Canal in southern California is a prime example. As the
Colorado River continually silted up the canal and eventually flooded the entire works,
farmers cried out for a canal built entirely in the United States that could withstand
the wildly varying flows and courses of the Colorado, but this could not be done
without an upstream dam (eventually Hoover Dam). See Imperial Irrigation District,
How it Works, The ImperialDam, at http://www.iid.com/water/works-imperialdam.html.
51. WESTERN WATER PoLicY REVIEW ADVISORY COMMISSION, WATER IN THE WEST:
CHALLENGE
FOR
THE
NEXT
CENTURY
4-3
(1998),
available
at
http://www.den.doi.gov/wwprac/reports.htm.
52. 43 U.S.C. § 372 (1994) (beneficial use is the basis, measure, and limit of water
use under the Reclamation Act); see also N.M. CONST., art. XVI, § 3; Jicarilla Apache
Tribe v. United States, 657 F.2d 1126, 1133-34 (10th Cir. 1981).
53. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 657 F.2d at 1134 (citations omitted); see also Imperial
Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 275 Cal. Rptr. 250, 255 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991) (estimates of water loss by the district's system ranged from 53,000 to 135,000
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In addition to this express limitation, federal reclamation projects
generally must conform with state water laws, unless doing so would
interfere with other federal requirements or interests. 4
The CWA, ESA, and NEPA are federal statutes that apply
throughout the United States. A report to Congress on the proper
federal role in western water management well summarizes the
intricacies:
The federal role continues to be fragmented, with multiple agencies,
each with specific and narrow legal mandates and constituencies,
managing or controlling certain aspects of water uses. For example,
Reclamation built and manages specific projects primarily for the
benefit of agricultural water users, although this mission has
broadened considerably in recent decades.
The Corps [of
Engineers] manages projects, maintains navigation channels, and
operates and maintains reservoirs and levees to control floods and for
such incidental uses such as hydroelectric power generation. The

Fish and Wildlife Service (Service) and the National Marine Fisheries
Service administer the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the Fish
and Wildlife Coordination Act (FWCA) to protect the fish and
wildlife whose survival may be jeopardized by a federal activity or
where private actions, such as a diversion, threaten to harm the
secies when water is removed from stream channels. More recently,
e Clean Water Act allowed a new federal agency, the Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA), to set water quality standards for and
control discharges into surface waters, but specifically exempted
agricultural return flows as nonpoint sources.

When one delves into the complexities of a river system,
particularly a western river, these authorities transform to a maze of
laws. Each major river basin will inevitably acquire its own "Law of the
River"-the product of decades of litigation and negotiation among
these and other parties.
III. THE LAW OF THE COLORADO RIVER
The Secretary of the Interior serves as the "Watermaster" for the
Lower Colorado River, the only river system in the country that has
been so federalized. 6 The Secretary delegated the responsibility of
acre-feet per year through "canal spill" and 312,000 to 559,000 acre-feet per year
through excessive "tailwater"); Erickson v. Queen Valley Ranch Co., 99 Cal. Rptr. 446,
450 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (finding five-sixths of flow of water lost in delivery via earthen
ditch inefficient and wasteful and therefore not beneficial use even though it was
consistent with local custom); Doherty v. Pratt, 124 P. 574, 576 (Nev. 1912) (allowing
two-thirds of the water diverted to become lost in a swamp is not a reasonable and
economical method of diversion).
54. 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1994); California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978);
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 589 (1963); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken,
357 U.S. 275, 291 (1958).
55. WESTERN WATERPOLICY REVIEW ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 51, at 4-3 to 46; see also id. at 4-4 to 4-5 for a table of Major Federal Laws and Actions Affecting
Western Water Resources.
56. Historically, the basin states have feared California's rapid water consumption.
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 555 (1963). For most of the twentieth century,
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operating and maintaining the extensive network of dams, reservoirs,
water diversions, levees, canals, and other water control and delivery
systems on the river to the Bureau of Reclamation ("Bureau"). The
Bureau's authority and discretion is guided by a body of treaties,
Congressional enactments, 57compacts, and other agreements known as
the "The Law of the River."
Significant components of the Law of the River include the
Colorado River Compact of 1922,58 the Boulder Canyon Project Act of
1928,"' the Treaty Respecting the Utilization of Waters of the Colorado
and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande of 1944,60 the Supreme
Court's decision and subsequent decree in Arizona v. California," and
the Colorado River Basin Project Act. 62 Environmental laws, including
the ESA, NEPA, and CWA must also be considered part of the Law of
the River due to the substantial obligations they impose on the Bureau
of Reclamation. 6 South of the border, Mexican federal law is
pertinent.
The Colorado River Compact of 1922 created the Upper Division
(Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah) and the Lower Division
(Arizona, Nevada and California), and allocated 7.5 million acre-feet
of water each to the Upper and Lower Basins. 4 Soon after, Congress
only California was able to acquire water rights due to its population and the amount
of farmland. REISNER, supra note 15, at 124. Arizona's fears were particularly intense
and spawned "five lawsuits in the United States Supreme Court, a filibuster in the
Senate, a muster of troops by Arizona at the California border, and hundreds of
thousands of words in congressional hearings and judicial proceedings." Charles J.
Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1, 37-38 (1966). Arizona was concerned
that the doctrine of prior appropriation would apply in this situation, giving California
the right to the water because it was the first to put the water to a beneficial use. The
other less developed basin states wanted to assure that water would be available for
them in the future. See Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922). Thus, the
Supreme Court held that Congress placed the "full power to control, manage, and
operate the Government's Colorado River works and to make contracts for the sale
and delivery of water" in the hands of the Secretary. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at
594.
57. Eric L. Garner & Michelle Ouellette, FutureShock? The Law of the Colorado River
in the Twenty-First Century, 27 ARiz. ST. L.J. 469, 470 (1995).
58. Colorado River Compact, 123 Colo. Sess. Laws 684, COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-61101 to 104 (2001).
59. Boulder Canyon Project Act of Dec. 21, 1928, ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057 (codified as
amended at 43 U.S.C. § 617 (1994)).
60. Treaty Respecting the Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers
and of the Rio Grande, Feb. 3, 1944, U.S.- Mex., 59 Stat. 1219 [hereinafter Water
Treaty of 1944].
61. Arizona v. California I, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Arizona v. California II, 376 U.S.
340 (1964) (decree implementing opinion of 373 U.S. 546).
62. Colorado River Basin Project Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1556 (1994).
63. Arizona v. California , 373 U.S. at 594 (recognizing that "Congress still has
broad powers over this navigable international stream [and] can undoubtedly reduce
or enlarge the Secretary's power if it wishes"); see also BUREAU OF REcLAmATION, FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, COLORADO RIVER INTERIM SURPLUS CRITERIA 1-10

(2000).
64. 70 Cong. Rec. 324, 325 (1928). The Lower Basin, for example, "means those
parts of the states of Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah within and
from which waters naturally drain into the Colorado River System below Lee Ferry,"
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quantified, and the Secretary contracted, the allocations to the Lower
Basin states of California, Nevada and Arizona in the Boulder Canyon
Project Act ("BCPA").6 The Water Treaty of 1944 then allocated 1.5
million acre-feet to Mexico, with the prospect of another 200,000 acrefeet to Mexico if the United States determines a surplus exists.66 Later,
the Upper Colorado River Compact of 1948 allocated percentages of
the Upper Basin's 7.5 million acre-feet share to Colorado, Utah, New
Mexico, Arizona and Wyoming.
The Supreme Court approved the States' apportionments and set
the priorities for Colorado River waters in Arizona v. California.
Although Congress and the Supreme Court approved the States'
apportionments, they amended the Colorado River Compact, via the
BCPA and Decree respectively, by reestablishing the priorities for
Colorado River waters. Top priorities include controlling floods,69
improving navigation, and regulating the flow, the secondary priorities
are water for irrigation and domestic purposes, and the lowest priority
is power generation." The Decree enjoins the Secretary to release
water in accordance with these priorities."' The other top priorities,
regulating the flow of the river and improving navigation, are purely
within the Secretary's discretion.7
and all parts within the states but outside the basin which will be served by those
waters. Id. art. II(g).
65. See Boulder Canyon Project Act of Dec. 21, 1928, ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057 (codified
as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 671 (1994)) (apportioning the 7.5 million acre-feet per year
among the Lower Basin states: 300,000 acre-feet per year to Nevada; 2.8 million acrefeet per year to Arizona; and 4.4 million acre-feet per year to California). The BCPA
also requires parties using water to have contracts with the Secretary of the Interior
whose terms are for permanent service, "under such general regulations as [the
Secretary] may prescribe." Id. § 617d. Between 1930 and 1944, the Secretary entered
into contracts for water delivery with five California agencies, the State of Nevada, and
the State of Arizona for their full entitlements. The Secretary has contracts with water
users in California amounting to 5.362 million acre-feet per year, almost one million
acre-feet greater than its apportionment. See MILTON N. NATHANSON, UPDATING THE
HOOVERDAm DocuMEiNTs 1-27 (1978).
66. Water Treaty of 1944, supra note 60, art. 10. However, average annual flows
immediately before the Compact negotiations were approximately 18.1 million acrefeet per year (1906-21). WESTERN WATER POLIcy REVIEW ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra
note 51, at 2-3. Long-term annual average flow is closer to 13.5 million acre-feet per
year, leaving the river seriously overappropriated. DALE PONTIUs, COLORADO RIVER
BASIN STUDY6 (1997).
67. Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, 63 Stat. 31, 33, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 3762-101 to 106 (2001) (allocating 51.75 percent to Colorado, 11.25 percent to New
Mexico, 23 percent to Utah, 14 percent to Wyoming, and 50,000 acre-feet to Arizona).
68. Arizona v. California I, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Arizona v. California II, 376 U.S.
340 (1964).
69. The Corps of Engineers dictates flood control for Lake Mead; the Bureau
manages for flood control related to the Davis and Parker Dams. See Flood Control
Act of 1944, 33 U.S.C. § 709; U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, WATER CONTROL MANUAL
FOR FLOOD CONTROL: HOOVER DAM AND LAxE MEAD COLORADO RIVER, NEVADA AND
ARIZONA (1982).

70. 43 U.S.C. § 61 7 e (1994).
71. Arizona v. CaliforniaII, 376 U.S. at 341.
72. Laughlin River Tours, Inc. v. Bureau of Reclamation, 730 F. Supp. 1522, 1524
(D. Nev. 1990).
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In the decree, the Court held that the Secretary controls Colorado
River water in the Lower Basin. s Congress granted the Secretary
" 5
"broad power"74 to "make contracts for the distribution of the water.
Nothing in the BCPA changes the decision that the Secretary's
contracts "control the apportionment of water among the States"" and
that the Secretary "is not bound by these sections to follow state law."77
The Colorado River Basin Project Act directed the Secretary to
adopt "operating criteria" for the long-range operation of Colorado
River reservoirs in order to comply with and carry out the provisions of
the Colorado River Compact, the Uper Colorado River Basin
Compact, and the Water Treaty of 1944.' Each year, the Bureau of
Reclamation consults with the seven basin states, the general public
and other interested parties in preparing the Annual Operating Plan
("AOP") for Colorado River reservoirs.9 The AOP is developed with
"appropriate consideration of the uses of the reservoirs for all
purposes, including flood control, river regulation, beneficial
consumptive uses, power production, water quality control, recreation,
enhancement of fish and wildlife, and other environmental factors."80
The plan also determines the amount of water available for delivery
pursuant to the 1944 U.S. Mexico Water Treaty.81 Finally, the AOP
determines whether the reasonable consumptive use requirements of
users in the Lower Basin will be met under a "normal," "surplus," or

73. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 588-90. The Court held that the Boulder
Canyon Project Act's provisions were:
[P]ersuasive that Congress intended the Secretary ...both to carry out the
allocation of the waters of the main Colorado River among the Lower Basin
States and to decide which users within each State would get water ....
[H] ad Congress intended so to fetter the Secretary's discretion, it would have
done so in clear and unequivocal terms.
Id. at 580-81.
74. Id.at 585.
75. Id.
76. Id,at 586.
77. Id.; see also id. at 589.
78. 43 U.S.C. § 1552 (1994); U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Criteriafor Coordinated
Long Range Operation of Colorado River Reservoirs Pursuant to the Colorado River Basin
Project Act of September 30, 1968, at http://www.lc.usbr.gov/-glOOO/pdfiles/opcriter.pdf
[hereinafter OperatingCriteria].
79. Articles I-IV of the Operating Criteria require the Secretary to prepare an
Annual Operating Plan, the purposes of which are to determine: (1) the projected
operation of the Colorado River reservoirs under varying hydrologic and climatic
conditions; (2) the quantity of water considered necessary as of September 30, to be in
storage in the Upper Basin reservoirs as required by Section 602(a) of the CRBPA; (3)
water available for delivery to Mexico; (4) whether the Secretary will declare a
"normal," "surplus," or "shortage" condition as outlined in Article III of the Operating
Criteria; and (5) whether water apportioned to, but unused by, one or more Lower
Basin States exists and can be used to satisfy beneficial consumptive use requests of
mainstream users in other Lower Basin States as provided in the Arizona v. California
decree. i; see also United States Bureau of Reclamation, 2002 Annual OperatingPlan
for ColoradoRiver System Reservoirs, at http://www.lc.usbr.gov/g4000/aop02.final.pdf.
80. OperatingCriteria,supra note 78, art. 1(2).
81. Id. at preamble.
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"shortage" condition.2 While the AOP purports to take fish and
wildlife values into account when planning operations, the guidelines
do not contain any environmental criteria.
If the Secretary determines that surplus water is available, he may
allocate water to the states in excess of their apportionments, pursuant
to Article II(b) (2) of the Decree-50 percent to California, 46 percent
to Arizona, and 4 percent to Nevada.13 At the close of its term, the
Clinton administration promulgated Interim Surplus Guidelines to
establish criteria for determining and allocating surplus waters until
2016.4
In recent years, Congress and the basin states have become more
alert to the ecological problems facing the Colorado River. Water
quality concerns in the 1970s led to the Colorado River Basin Salinity
Control Acte' and environmental and aesthetic concerns in the Grand
Canyon led to the Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992.W
Additionally, efforts to include the river's delta in United States
discussions have increased our understanding of Mexican
environmental laws.
To begin, the General Law on Ecological Balance and
Environmental Protection is the principle federal environmental law
in Mexico and sets forth general principles that guide ecological
policies as well as instruments for implementing those policies. 7 Most
environmental protection functions are the responsibility of one
agency, the Secretariat for Environment and Natural Resources
(Secretarfa de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales or
"SEMARNAT"), who implements the Federal Ecology Law.8 8 The
federal government implements matters under this general law by
issuing regulations, which are in turn implemented by technical
standards, known as Official Mexican Norms. 9 Under this process,
Mexico has established four levels of protection for sensitive species:
endangered, threatened, rare and species under special protection.8
82. Id. art. 111(3).
83. Arizona v. California II, 376 U.S. 340, 342 (1964).
84. RECORD OF DECISION COLORADO RIVER INTERIM SuRPLuS GUIDELINES, FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (2001). The Interim Surplus guidelines define

surplus according to the level of Lake Mead rather than by hydrology and forecast,
providing a more reliable supply.
85. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1571-1599 (1994).
86. Pub. L. No. 102-275, tit. XVIII, 106 Stat. 4669.
87. Ley General del Equilibrio Ecol6gico y ia Protecci6n al Ambiente, at
http://www.cddhcu.gob.mx.leyinfo/148/ [hereinafter Federal Ecology Law].
See
generally ENVIRONMENTAL

LAW INSTITUTE, DECENTRALIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION IN MEXICO: AN OVERVIEW OF STATE AND LOCAL LAWS AND INSTITUTIONS 5-30

(1996) [hereinafter DECENTRALIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN MEXICO],
available at http://www.eli.org/pdf/resreportdecen.pdf.
88. With the new administration, SEMARNAT formed out of SEMARNAP when the
"P" (Pesca or Fisheries) was relocated to SAGAPA, the Secretariat of Agriculture,
Livestock, Fisheries and Food.
89. DECENTRALIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN MEXICO, supra note 87, at
6.
90. "Normas Oficiales Mexicanas, Que Determina las Especies y Subespecies de
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This norm lists over 2,000 species, including several in the Lower
Colorado River basin-vaquita, totoaba, razorback sucker, Yuma
clapper rail, and desert pupfish.1
Agencies within SEMARNAT include the Comisi6n Nacional del
Agua ("CNA") and Instituto Nacional de Ecologia ("INE"). CNA has
jurisdiction over water quality, water resources and planning, and
administers Mexico's system of water rights and pumping permits.92
CNA is encouraging decentralization of its decisionmaking by
participating in local watershed councils called District Water
Committees (Comit6s Hidrdulicos)." INE carries out environmental
research and development, evaluates Mexico's environmental policies
and implements its natural resource programs." INE administers the
National System of Protected Natural Areas and is responsible for
managing the Biosphere Reserve of the Upper Gulf of California." A
reflection of his administration's priority on the U.S.-Mexico border,
President Fox has created a new executive position for border affairs. 6
IV. THE LAW OF THE RIO GRANDE
The Law of the Rio Grande is quite similar to that of the Colorado;
it contains an interstate compact, federal and state laws, and
international treaties. It also retains vestiqes of indigenous culture and
Spanish and Mexican laws and grants. ' Although not addressed
Flora y Fauna Silvestres Terrestres y Acuiticas en Peligro de Extinci6n, Amenazadas,
Raras y las Sujetas a Protecci6n Especial y que Establece Especificaciones para su
Protecci6n," D.O., 16 de mayo de 1994 (NOM-059-ECOL-1994), available at
http://www.ine.gob.mx/dgra/normas/rec-nat/no-59.htm.
91. Id.
92. DECENTRALIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECrION IN MEXICO, supra note 87, at
18.
93. Jennifer Pitt et al., Two Nations, One River: ManagingEcosystem Conservation in the
Colorado River Delta, 40 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 819, 839 n.86 (2000).
94. DECENTRALIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN MEXICO, supra note 87, at
18.
95. Pitt, supra note 93, at 838-39. Mexico established the Upper Gulf of California
and Colorado River Delta Biosphere Reserve (El Alto Golfo de California y Delta del
Rio Colorado). It is recognized by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO), has a management plan, and contains a core zone
and a buffer zone totaling 934,755 hectares. See Wendy Laird et al., Cooperation across
Borders: A BriefHistory of Biosphere Reserves in the Sonoran Desert, 39 J. OF THE SOUTHWEST
307, 309 (1997).
96. See David A. Shirk, Mexico's New Border Commission: A First Look, BORDERLINES,
April 2001. Also in 2000, Mexico adopted a new federal wildlife law, Ley General de
Vida
Silvestre,
D.O.F.
7
de
marzo
2000,
available
at
http://www.ine.gob.mx/dgvs/leyvs.html; see William Snape III et al., Protecting
Ecosystems Under the EndangeredSpecies Act: The SonoranDesert Example, 41 WASHBURN L.J.
14, 45-48 (2001).
97. After the war with Mexico, Mexico ceded nearly half its territory (529,000
square miles) to the United States Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits and Settlement
with the Republic of Mexico, Feb. 2, 1848, U.S.-Mex., 9 Stat. 922 [hereinafter Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo]. Subsequently, the Gadsden Treaty clarified boundary issues
unresolved by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and Mexico ceded an additional
29,142,000 acres to the United States Boundary Treaty, Dec. 30, 1853, U.S.-Mex., 10
Stat. 1031; see also ERNIE NIEMI & TOM McGuCKIN, WATER MANAGEMENT STUDY: UPPER
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above, but just as applicable, are Indian water rights and trust assets."
In the Middle Rio Grande, there are approximately eighteen Indian
pueblos (Acoma, Cochiti, Isleta, Jemez, Laguna, Namb6, Picuris,
Pojoaque, San Felipe, San Ildefonso, San Juan, Sandia, Santa Ana,
Santa Clara, Santo Domingo, Tesuque, Taos, Zia), "the Navajo Nation
and certain Navajo allottees, and the Jicarilla Apache Nation.""
Annual flow of approximately one million acre-feet engenders a
constant balancing of supply and demand; the presence of
unquantified, senior water rights threatens to tip the scales."'
Winters v. United States established the "doctrine of reserved rights,"
which ensures that lands set aside by the federal government have
sufficient water for the purposes for which they were set aside.' ' The
reservation of water dates back to the establishment of the
reservation.0
Later, the Supreme Court developed the "practicably
irrigable acreage" ("PIA") standard by which to calculate the water
Indian water rights were thus established and
rights of a reservation.'
to be met from each state's entitlement.
In turn, the United States holds Indian land and resources in trust,
with the beneficiary interest residing in the tribe. This fiduciary
relationship has imposed a responsibility on the federal government to
protect tribal property, treaty rights, and culture, including water
rights.0 4 The trust responsibility imposes "most exacting fiduciary
standards" on every federal agency.' p Inevitably, this fiduciary duty
Rio GRANDE BASIN 11 (1997); James M. Burson, Middle Rio Grande Regional Water
Resource Planning: The Pitfalls and the Promises,40 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 533, 537-38 (2000).
98. There are generally recognized thirty-four tribes in the Lower Colorado River
basin with both quantified and unquantified water rights. See WESTERN WATER POLICY
REVIEW ADVISORY COMMISSION,

supra note 51, at 75.

99. Memorandum from the Regional Director, Region 2, to Area Manager,
Albuquerque Area Office, Bureau of Reclamation 6 (June 29, 2001) (on file with
author).
100. See generally Allen V. Kneese & Gilbert Bonem, Hypothetical Shocks to Water
Allocation Institutions in the Colorado Basin, in NEW COURSES FOR THE COLORADO RIVER:
MAJOR ISSUES FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 87, 94-98 (Gary D. Weatherford & F. Lee Brown

eds., 1986).
101. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908) (holding that water rights
exist because reservation lands were practically useless without irrigation and
argument for retention of waters is of more force since ambiguities are resolved in
favor of Indians).
102. In the case of some Pueblos, whose sovereignty was recognized by prior Spanish
and Mexican governments, their water rights may predate the reservation. NIEMI &
McGuCKIN, supra note 97, at 20; see also Burson, supra note 97, at 545-48.
103. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 595-601 (1963) (granting approximately
761,000 acre-feet to five tribes along the mainstem and applying the reservation of
water to other types of federal reservations, such as wildlife refuges and parks).
Recently, the Arizona Supreme Court rejected PIA as the standard for determining
allocation, and established a set of factors based on history and culture of the tribe and
geography, topography, population growth and groundwater availability of the
reservation. In re Gen. Adjudication of all Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. &
Source, 35 P.3d 68 (Ariz. 2001).
104. See generally Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native
Sovereignty: The Trust DoctrineRevisited, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 1471 (1994).
105. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942); see also Sec. Order

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 5

comes into conflict
with implementation of other federal statutes and
6
obligations."1
Just as Colorado River basin states sought to protect their rights
from California's use, downstream users on the Rio Grande, including
the governments of Mexico and Texas, sought guaranteed delivery of
historic water rights in response to increased withdrawals by Colorado
and New Mexico. The U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty of 1906 obligates the
United States to deliver 60,000 acre-feet of water each year to the
International Dam at Ciudad Juarez."'7 To help fulfill its delivery
commitment, the United States built Elephant Butte Dam and
Reservoir, the southern boundary of the Middle Rio Grande.' °s In
1938, Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas entered into the Rio Grande
Compact, again to ensure the delivery of water to downstream users in
New Mexico and Texas." Each state's share is based on runoff, rather
than a set numerical allocation."
Federal involvement in the Middle Rio Grande began in earnest
when it launched the Middle Rio Grande Project. In 1947 and 1948,
the Bureau of Reclamation and Army Corps of Engineers prepared the
Rio Grande Flood Control Program-detailed studies and a joint
proposal for development of federal reclamation and flood and
sediment control works on the river."' The project called for the
Bureau to rehabilitate the dam and diversion facilities of the Middle
Rio Grande Conservancy District ("District" or "MRGCD"), which had
fallen into disrepair, channelize 127 miles of the river, and acquire the
District's outstanding debt."2 In return, the District conveyed its
property interests in the facilities to the Bureau."3 In 1962, Congress
No. 3206: American Indian Tribal Rights, Federal-Tribal Trust Responsibilities, and
the Endangered Species Act (June 5, 1997) (on file with author); Department of
Justice Policy on Indian Sovereignty And Government-to-Government Relations With
Indian Tribes, Op. Att'y Gen. (1995) (on file with author).
106. See infra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
107. Convention between the United States and Mexico, Equitable Distribution of
the Waters of the Rio Grande, Jan. 16, 1907, U.S.-Mex., art. II, 34 Stat. 2953, 2954.
The Water Treaty of 1944 also divides the Rio Grande waters, requiring delivery of
1.75 million acre-feet every five years from tributaries in Mexico to the river below
Elephant Butte. Water Treaty of 1944, supranote 60, art. IV.
108. NIEMI & MCGUCKIN, supra note 97, at 4, 9.
109. Rio Grande Compact, COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-66-101 to 102 (2001), 53 Stat.
785.
110. 1&
111. Congress approved those proposals in the Flood Control Acts of 1948 and
1950. Pub. L. No. 80-858, ch. 771, 62 Stat. 1175; Pub. L. No. 81-516, ch. 188, 64 Stat.
170.
112. See Middle Rio Grande Water Users' Ass'n v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy
Dist., 258 P.2d 391, 393 (1953) (holding the 1951 contract between MRGCD and the
Bureau valid).
113. By the late 1940s, 60 percent of farms in MRGCD, totaling 90 percent of
MRGCD's acreage, was delinquent in their taxes.
See MIDDLE RIO GRANDE
CONSERVANCY DISTICr WATER POLICIES PLAN 21-23 (C.T. DuMars & S.C. Nunn eds.,
1993). The United States would thus assume ownership of all MRGCD diversion and
storage facilities until project costs were repaid and Congress ordered a transfer back
to MRGCD. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 491, 498 (1994).
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approved the San Juan-Chama Project, which currently diverts up to
110,000 acre-feet of water from the San Juan River basin into the Rio
Grande." 4
The Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") also has a hand in
managing the reservoirs in the Middle Rio Grande. The Corps owns
and operates two major and several minor dams and reservoirs on the
river that trap sediment and prevent overbank flooding in the Middle
Rio Grande." 5 Abiquiu Dam and Reservoir are on the Rio Chama
below El Vado Reservoir, thirty-two river-miles upstream from the
confluence with the Rio Grande, and were completed in 1963.116
Abiquiu has a storage allocation of nearly 600,000 acre-feet for
sediment and flood control, but Congress has authorized up to
200,000 acre-feet for storage of San Juan-Chama or native Rio Grande
water.11
The second major Corps facility, Cochiti Dam and Reservoir,
located on the mainstem Rio Grande about fifty miles north of
Albuquerque, began filling in 1975.11 Cochiti has a storage capacity of
over 600,000 acre-feet for sediment and flood control purposes, but
has a 50,000 acre-foot "pool" dedicated to recreation and fish and
wildlife purposes.19
Other Corps dams and reservoirs that are part of the Middle Rio
Grande Project are Jemez Canyon Dam, located on the Jemez River
about 2.8 miles upstream from its confluence with the Rio Grande;
Platoro Dam on the Conejos River; and Galisteo Dam on Galisteo
Creek.'20 The various Flood Control Acts authorized all of these dams
for flood control and sediment retention, preventing overbank
flooding and sediment deposition.
V. SHARING POWER, CROSSING BOUNDARIES
As we have seen, there are myriad authorities influencing river
management to varying degrees. Domestic and international affairs,
federal, state and Indian governments have their own niches. As a
result, it is difficult for agencies to cooperate and share power among
themselves as
well as the regulated community and to cross political
12
boundaries.

1

114. 43 U.S.C. § 620a. New Mexico is still looking for additional ways to tap into the
Colorado. See Tania Soussan, State Considers Drawing on Gila Water, ALBUQUERQUEJ.,
Aug. 21, 2001, atAl.
115. Flood Control Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-645, 74 Stat. 480 (setting the
operating criteria for the Corps dams).
116. See supra note 111.
117. Pub. L. No. 97-140, 95 Stat. 1717, § 5(b) (authorizing SanJuan-Chama storage);
Pub. L. No. 100-522, 102 Stat. 2604 (authorizing Rio Grande storage).
118. Flood Control Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-645, 74 Stat. 488.
119. Pub. L. No. 88-293, 78 Stat. 171.
120. U.S. ARMY CoRPs OF ENGINEERS PROGRAMMATIC BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT OF U.S.
ARMY CoRPs OF ENGINEERS WATER-OPERATION RULES ON THE MIDDLE RIO GRANDE, NEW

MExico 7 (2001).
121. See Pitt, supranote 93, at 836-42.
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The most illustrative example is the perceived tension between the
United States Departments of Interior and State when dealing with
Lower Colorado River issues. In the Lower Basin, the Secretary of
Interior, through the Bureau of Reclamation, is the "Watermaster,"
who has a great deal of authority and discretion in the operation of
federal facilities. However, United States management of the entire
basin has severely degraded the Colorado River Delta and Upper Gulf
of California. 2
The delta once spanned approximately 780,000
hectares of wetlands and riparian areas-nearly the size of Rhode
Island.'
In the past century, river flows into the Delta have been
reduced nearly 75 percent; from 1906 to 1921 flows averaged 18.1
million acre-feet, 4 but from 1984 to 1999 they averaged 4.2 million
acre-feet.12 1 With the construction of Hoover Dam in 1936, the Delta
began to dry up as the river filled huge reservoirs and was diverted to
agricultural and municipal use. 26 When Glen Canyon Dam was
completed and Lake Powell began filling, forty-five years and over
twenty dams later, water rarely made it all the way to the Gulf.2 7 The
delta has shrunk to about 60,000 hectares, but is still a major stopover
on the Pacific Flyway and supports numerous species listed by one or
both countries as endangered, threatened, or sensitive.
Despite the Secretary's enormous influence in managing the river,
the Water Treaty of 1944 has placed consultation with Mexico
regarding these impacts in the domain of the International Boundary
and Water Commission ("IBWC"), subject to its different mission and
priorities and diplomatic process.
The IBWC, known as the
Comisi6n Internacional de Lfmites y Aguas ("CILA") in Mexico, is a
binational institution with authority over surface waters in the border
region and is responsible for carrying out the Water Treaty of 1944.12s
122. See generally Peter Friederici, Stolen River: The Colorado River and Its Delta Are
Losing Out, 11 DEFENDERS 10 (1998).
123. Edward Glenn et al., Effects of Water Management on the Wetlands of the Colorado
River Delta, Mexico, 10 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1175, 1176 (1996).
124. WESTERN WATER POLICYREvIEwADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 51, at 2-9.
125.

EDWARD

P.

GLENN,

IMPORTANCE OF UNITED STATES' WATER FLOWS TO THE

COLORADO RIVER DELTA AND THE NORTHERN GULF OF CALIFORNIA, MEXICO
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(unpublished manuscript) (1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter IMPORTANCE OF
UNITED STATES' WATER FLOWS].

126. Glenn, supra note 123, at 1177.
127. Id.
128. NORTH AMERICAN WETLANDS CONSERVATION

COUNCIL, WETLAND MANAGEMENT &

RESTORATION IN THE COLORADO RIVER DELTA: THE FIRST STEPS 4 (1998).

129. Water Treaty of 1944, supra note 60, art. II.
130. The 1944 Water Treaty provides that the IBWC shall consist of a United States
Section and a Mexican Section.
The Treaty further provides that it shall in all respects have the status of an
international body, that the head of each Section must be an Engineer
Commissioner and that wherever Treaty provisions call for joint action or
joint agreement by the two Governments such matters shall be handled by or
through the Department of State of the United States and the Secretariat of
Foreign Relations of Mexico.
The
International
Boundary,
United
States
and
Mexico,
at
http://www.ibwc.state.gov/ORGANIZA/aboutus.htm.
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Their scope of work includes boundary maintenance, reclamation
projects, allocation of water resources, construction of sanitation works
and resolution of treaty and water quality disputes."'
Until recently, IBWC/CILA focused on issues of water supply and
quality rather than environmental protection. A look at past treaty
minutes and technical reports demonstrates the emphasis on
construction, delivery, and water quality."' In 1997, IBWC established
a work group covering studies of the Colorado River delta.'33 More
technical than policy oriented, the objective of the Fourth Work
Group is to "perform a joint baseline study of the water and natural
resource conditions in the Cienega de Santa Clara and the adjoining
lowermost part of the Delta of the Colorado River to guide the
participating agencies in making recommendations .... 14 The Work
Group has several proposals before it, but has yet to act on any.131
Notwithstanding the international diplomacy, it has been the
Department of the Interior who has spurred great advances for
binational Colorado River and Delta restoration. 3 6 The delta issue has
gathered momentum over the past decade, with the publication by
environmental organizations and scientists of various studies noting
the importance of continuous flows to the delta and the likelihood
that increasing use in the United States will end these flows. 3 7 The
Department, with so many agencies active in the border region, has
worked closely with its counterparts in Mexico, signing the Letter of
Intent with SEMARNAP,
the Joint Declaration, 9 and other cross131.

CharlesJ. Meyers & Richard L. Noble, The ColoradoRiver: The Treaty with Mexico,

19 STAN. L. REv. 367 (1967).

132.

See generally Stephen P. Mumme, Reinventing the InternationalBoundary and Water

Commission, BORDERLINES,July 2001.

133.

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY AND WATER COMMISSION,

IBWC-34-97,

MEETING OF

THE COMMISSION TO FORM A FOURTH COLORADO RIVER MATTERS TASK FORCE REGARDING
THE COLORADO RIVER DATA MEXICALI, BAJA CALIFORNIA (1997) (on file with author).
134. TERMS OF REFERENCE, LOWER COLORADO RIVER DELTA TASKFORCE (October 28,

1997) (on file with author).
135. The work group has recently coordinated and approved proposals to develop
an ecological-scientific studies database, a water flow inundation model, and a pilot
restoration project. INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY AND WATER COMMISSION, ANNUAL
REPORT 2000, at 7 (2000) (on file with author).
136. For example, the IBWC even leads consultation with the government of Mexico
when the Department or an agency proposes an action that may impact the delta or
Gulf. See BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER INTERIM SURPLUS CRITERIA: FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT vol. I, at 5-7 (2000); BUREAU OF RECLAMATION,
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT/FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT VIII-3

(1994) (describing the IBWC's consultation process with Mexico, with the assistance of
the Bureau of Reclamation) (on file with author).
137. See, e.g. DANIEL F. LUECKE ET AL., A DELTA ONCE MORE: RESTORING RIPARIAN AND
WETLAND HABITAT IN THE COLORADO RIVER DELTA (1999); Glenn, supra note 123, at
1184.
138. In 1997, Secretary Babbitt and Secretary Carabias signed ajoint Letter of Intent
announcing plans
to expand existing cooperative activities in the conservation of contiguous
natural

protected

areas, ...

to harmonize

activities

directed

at the

conservation of biological diversity.... beginning with pilot projects... in
Mexico, the Biosphere Reserves of the Alto Golfo de California y Delta del
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border initiatives between the FWS and SEMARNAT and INE.'4 °
IBWC, on the other hand, has moved exceedingly slowly in
recognizing the delta issue, despite its direct role in implementing the
Treaty.'
While attending a meeting held by the Department of the Interior,
in follow-up to the Joint Declaration, members of the United States
section of the IBWC suggested a "conceptual minute" to the Water
Treaty of 1944.14' A conceptual minute does not call for action such as
construction or boundary work, but instead calls for cooperative
43
work-in this case, assessing the threats to and restoring the delta.
On December 12, 2000, the United States and Mexico signed such
a minute-an agreement on a framework for cooperation on studies
and recommendations regarding the riparian and estuarine ecology of
the Delta.' 41
Minute 306 recognizes the growing binational
collaboration among government authorities and scientific, academic
and non-governmental organizations interested in preserving the
Delta and Upper Gulf.4 4 The minute will establish a framework for
Rio Colorado... [including] harmonization and coordination of policies
leading to the conservation of natural and cultural resources.
Letter of Intent between the Department of Interior (DOI) of the United States and
the Secretariat of Environment, Natural Resources and Fisheries (SEMARNAP) of the
United Mexican States forJoint Work in Natural Protected Areas on the United StatesMexico Border (May 5, 1997) (on file with author).
139. In May 2000, the United States and Mexico collaborated on ajoint Declaration
that recognizes the increasing efforts of non-governmental organizations and
communities and the IBWC Task Force. Joint Declaration between the Department of
the Interior (DOI) of the United States of America and the Secretariat of
Environment, Natural Resources and Fisheries (SEMARNAP) of the United Mexican
States to Enhance Cooperation in the Colorado River Delta (May 18, 2000) (on file
with author). The countries have committed to support the Task Force, coordinate
research efforts and "[s]trengthen cooperative action and mechanisms, to improve
and conserve the natural and cultural resources of the Colorado River Delta, including
the river and associated wetland habitats." Id.
140. See, e.g.,
North American Wetlands Conservation Council Participation in
Conservation Efforts in the Delta of the Colorado River, Mexico and Summary List of
Delta Projects [where DOI is involved] (distributed at United States Stakeholders
Workshop, Colorado River Delta, Oct. 11, 2000) (Oct. 2000) (on file with author).
141. While the Fourth Work Group formed in 1997, it was inactive for two years.
Pitt, supra note 93, at 837 n.77. The lack of activity may also be due to "the position of
the United States State Department through the United States Section of the
International Boundary and Water Commission that the United States does not
mitigate for impacts in a foreign country."
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT COLORADO RIVER INTERIM SURPLUS CRITERIA, vol. I,

at 3.17-3 (2000).
142. U.S. Stakeholder Meeting for the Implementation of the DOI-SEMARNAP
Joint Declaration on the Colorado River Delta (Oct. 11, 2000) (on file with author).
143. Minute 302 to the 1944 Treaty is another example of a conceptual minute. See
http://www.ibwc.state.gov/FORAFFAI/MINUTES/minindex.HTM.
144. Conceptual Framework for United States-Mexico Studies for Future
Recommendations Concerning the Riparian and Estuarine Ecology of the Limitrophe
Section of the Colorado River and its Associated Delta (Minute 306), available at
http://www.ibwc.state.gov/FORAFFAI/MINUTES/minindex.HTM;
see also Ken
Ellingwood & Tony Perry, U.S., Mexico Pledge to Save ColoradoDelta,L.A. TIMES, Dec. 26,
2000, at A3.
145. Minute 306, supranote 144.
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cooperation between the United States and Mexico, including
examining possible approaches to ensure use of water for ecological
purposes, and a forum for public participation and exchange
4 6 of
information, and will develop joint studies and recommendations.'
Before Minute 306, the primary obstacle facing Delta restoration
was the absence of a binational forum facilitating comprehensive
restoration and long-term planning while also empowering
nontraditional
decisionmakers
such
as
non-governmental
organizations and academic institutions. 4 Minute 306 was the catalyst
for the U.S.-Mexico Binational Symposium on the Colorado River
Delta. 48 Unfortunately, the tragedies of September 11 impeded the
participants' full attendance and attention and 4 9 we wait for the
Symposium's proceedings to discuss the next steps.1

Lest the reader think this an extreme example of interagency
cooperation, the presence of Indian pueblos and tribes in a river basin
presents a similar dynamic because tribes too are sovereigns. Adding
another cook to the kitchen, the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA")
represents Indian Trust assets for over thirty-four Indian tribes in the
Lower Colorado River Basin, as well as approximately twenty tribes and
pueblos in the Middle Rio Grande. Even the Department of Interior
itself may have conflicting mandates in these situations, where
protecting Indian trust assets may
conflict with operating Bureau water
5
projects or enforcing the ESA. 1
The trust relationship requires the Department of Interior (or any
federal agency) to conduct government-to-government consultation
with Indian tribes and Pueblos. 5 When a federal agency plans to take
action that may affect trust assets, including water rights, the agency
must consult with the affected tribes and thereafter represent those
concerns and rights in the federal government and in environmental
and other compliance processes for the action.'52
146. Id.
147. Press Release, United States and Mexico Sign Agreement on Colorado River
Delta, (Dec. 13, 2000) (recognizing growing influence of these stakeholders), available
at http://www.ibwc.state.gov/PAO/CURPRESS/ColoradoMin3O6final.htm.
Cf
Roberto Sanchez, Public Participationand the IBWC: Challenges and Options, 33 NAT.
REsOURcEsJ. 283 (1993) (discussing the historic lack of public participation in IBWC
processes).
148. Colorado River Delta Symposium, Welcome and Objectives, Mexicali, Baja
California, Sept. 11-12, 2001 (on file with author).
149. See Brent Israelsen, Rejuvenating Colorado River Delta Remains at Odds With Water
Rights, SALT LAKE TRIB., Sept. 17, 2001.
150. See, e.g., Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 256 (D. D.C.
1972), modified on other grounds, 360 F. Supp. 669 (D. D.C. 1973), rev'd on other grounds,
499 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975); Tim Vollmann, The
Endangered Species Act and Indian Water Rights, 11 NAT. RES. & ENvr. 39 (1996).
151. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies,
Government-to-Government Relations with Native American Tribal Governments, 59
Fed. Reg. 22,951 (May 4, 1994) (Government-to-Government Directive); see also Exec.
Order No. 13175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000).
152. See supra note 151; see also Klamath Tribes v. United States, 1996 WL 924509 (D.
Or. 1996).
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The difficulties inherent in such an arrangement are manifest
when it is the Department of the Interior itself undertaking the action.
In the Middle Rio Grande, the FWS is currently involved in ESA
litigation involving the endangered silvery minnow and southwestern
willow flycatcher.' 5' Early in 2001, therefore, FWS quickly issued a
biological opinion on the impacts of federal and nonfederal activities
on these species in the Middle Rio Grande. Before issuance of the
biological opinion, the Fish and Wildlife Service must consult with
Indian governments.
After the government-to-government consultation, the Department
must reconcile the duty of the FWS to enforce the ESA for the
conservation of the silvery minnow and southwestern willow flycatcher,
with the duty of the FWS as manager of national wildlife refuges in the
Middle Rio Grande, with the duty of the BIA as trustee for the Indian
trust assets, and with the duty of the Bureau of Reclamation to comply
with the ESA. 5 4 Given a short timeline and numerous tribal
governments, the FWS cannot always accomplish this successfully.
On the state level, water resources departments, fish and game
departments, environment departments and river commissions are
very heavily invested in river management. Of course, irrigation
districts have long-standing interests since they hold significant water
rights and contracts.' 55 With the advent of federal environmental laws,
new stakeholders are demanding input into decisionmaking. Here
too, the state-federal nexus often generates conflict, where state and
local interests often resent enforcement of federal laws, regarding
them 56
as unfunded federal mandates and impositions on states'
rights.
For example, in the Middle Rio Grande, there is extensive
information showing that the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy
District's ("MRGCD") water diversions are wasteful, far beyond any
reasonable beneficial use under both federal and state law.", MRGCD
received a state permit in the 1920s which has since expired.'
The
District has not applied for permanent water rights-called a "proof of
beneficial use"-to detail how much land is irrigated and with how
153. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, No. CV-99-1320 JP/RBM-ACE (D. N.M.
filedJuly 2, 2001) (challenging the adequacy of ESA Section 7 consultation).
154. For a general overview of Departmental responsibilities, see Mary Christina
Wood, Fulilling the Executive's Trust Responsibility Toward the Native Nations on
Environmental Issues: A Partial Critique of the Clinton Administration's Promises and
Performance,25 ENVrL. L. 733, 754 n.80 (1995).
155. See Lisa D. Brown, The Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District's Protected Water
Rights: Legal, Beneficial, or Against the Public Interest in New Mexico ?,40 NAT. RESoURcESJ.

1(2000).

156. See, e.g., Isabel Sanchez, IrrigationDistrict Can't Shake Feds,ALBUQUERQUEJ., May
31, 2001, at D1; Tania Soussan, Farmers' Water Called Safe, ALBUQUERQuEJ., Feb. 2, 2001,
at B3.
157. Ben Neary, Water DistrictMight be Headedfor Restrictions,SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN,
Mar. 7, 2001, at Bl.
158. Mike Taugher & Tania Soussan, Middle Rio Grande Water District's Use, Rights
Unknown, ALBUQUERQUEJ., Aug. 30, 1999, at Al.
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much water. 5 9 The State and Bureau have MRGCD reports showing
diversions averaging 609,000 acre-feet per year for 53,685 acres-more
than 11 acre-feet per acre.'6 This amount is double other irrigators in
New Mexico.16' The State Engineer has announced that these
diversions are excessive and that he expects an efficiency of greater
than 22 percent. New Mexico will only allow
62 consumption of 2.1 acrefeet per acre, a reduction of over one-third.'
By exceeding any reasonable beneficial use requirement,
MRGCD's diversions are thus unlawful under both federal and state
law. Yet MRGCD has not reduced its demand for water deliveries from
federal reservoirs, the Bureau still delivers all water MRGCD calls for,
and the State Engineer has not enforced beneficial use requirement
via a Proof of Beneficial Use ("PBU"). As long as neither the state nor
the federal government exercises its authority, the river suffers from
lack of certainty and inability to move forward.
Inertia can also set in when no entity has clear authority for a
necessary or proposed action. Instream flows, a challenge to obtain
and enforce in even the smallest stream, are nearly impossible to
discuss in the context of an international river. In the Lower Colorado
River basin, the Delta has received water in recent years largely due to
luck; this will end unless legal mechanisms are created to ensure
continued flows.' 63 The concept of instream flow rights has been
recognized by most western states and federally established with such
conservation laws as the Wild Scenic Rivers Act of 1968,'6 Grand
Canyon Protection Act of 199265 and the Central Valley Project
Improvement Act.'
The Upper Basin of the Colorado River has
provided for minimum streamfiows in a recovery program for
endangered fish. 61
Before we can extend these concepts
internationally to our neighbors in Mexico, we must first overcome the
159. Ben Neary, Make Do With Less Water, IrrigatorsTold, SANTA FE NEW MExICAN, Mar.
24, 2001, at Al.
160. Id. In addition, the original permit was for 120,000, so the District has also
shrunk. Id.
161. Lowry McAllen, A River of Discord,ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., Mar. 31, 2001, at Al.
162. Tania Soussan, Effective IrrigationAdvocated, ALBUQUERQUEJ., Mar. 24, 2001, at
Al.
163. Glenn, supra note 123, at 1184.
164. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (2000).
Portions of eight tributaries and the
mainstream have been studied for designation as wild and scenic rivers. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1276 (a)(34), (36), (38), (39), (43), (47), (55), (56).
165. Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, tit. XVIII, 106 Stat.
4669. As a result of the Act and an EIS, daily releases from Lake Powell are strictly
limited and occasional releases of 30,000 to 40,000 cfs are allowed to build sandbars
and stream channels. In 1996, for seven days the Grand Canyon was flooded in order
to restore sandbars and beaches. Scott K. Miller, Undamming Glen Canyon: Lunacy,
Rationality, or Prophey 7,19 STAN. ENVTL. LJ. 121, 162 (2000).
166. Pub. L. No. 102-575, tit. XXXIV, 106 Stat. 4706.
167. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE RECOvERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM FOR
ENDANGERED FISH SPECIES IN THE UPPER COLORADO RIVER BASIN 5-7 (rev. 1995); see also

David H. Getches, Competing Demandsfor the Colorado River, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 413,

447 (1985).
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obstacles of the Law of the River. Two challenges are apparent: the
ability to transfer water from the Upper Basin to the Lower Basin, and
from the Lower Basin to Mexico. State and federal entities in both
basins believe these challenges are actually impossibilities.'6
VI. FACING THE VOID
These are just some of the conflicts in each region. How do
basinwide projects deal with them? Watershed protection efforts must
continually face fragmented, incomplete and shared regulatory
schemes.
Current watershed or basin initiatives generally fall under the
auspices of federal environmental statutes. Examples are the Lower
Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation Program ("LCR MSCP")
and the Middle Rio Grande ESA Collaborative Program ("Program").
However, these programs arose out of crisis and exist solely to resolve
it-in these cases, ESA compliance. As a consequence, the scope and
coverage of these programs fail to encompass the problem watershed.
For example, the Middle Rio Grande ESA Collaborative Program
initially covered only that stretch of the Rio Grande where the
endangered silvery minnow still survives-from Cochiti Dam to
Elephant Butte Reservoir.'69 This stretch of river is only 5 percent of
the minnow's current habitat.'
It is not a complete watershed effort
because it lacks actions that will address additional endangered species
in the region. On the other hand, the LCR MSCP covers nearly 100
endangered and sensitive species, but has limited its geographic scope
to the United States portion of the river.'
Despite the limited
purpose and scope of these programs, they still have difficulty
overcoming the obstacles of a fragmented and overlapping regulatory
framework.
The Lower Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation Program
168. SeeJames S. Lochhead, An Upper Basin Perspective on California's Claims to Water
from the ColoradoRiver Part I: The Law of the River, 4 U. DENV. WATERL. REV. 290 (2001)
(asserting that interbasin transfers violate the Compact and Arizona v. California
Decree); BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL
COLORADO RIVER INTERIM SURPLUS CRrITERIA, vol. I, at 2-4 (2000).
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169. The biological opinion of 2001 expanded the scope to cover all activities from
the Colorado state line south to Elephant Butte Reservoir. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE
SERVICE, PROGRAMMATIC BIOLOGICAL OPINION ON THE EFFECTS OF ACTIONS ASSOCATED
WrI THE U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION'S, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS', AND NONFEDERAL ENTrrEs' DISCRETIONARY ACTONS RELATED TO WATER MANAGEMENT ON THE

MIDDLE Rio GRANDE, NEW MEXICO 56 (June 29, 2001) (on file with author).

170. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Rule to List the Rio
Grande Silvery Minnow as an Endangered Species, 59 Fed. Reg. 36,988 (July 20, 1994)
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
171. Multi-Species Conservation Program (MSCP) for the Lower Colorado River,
Arizona, Nevada, and California, 64 Fed. Reg. 27,000, 27,001 (May 18, 1999). The
boundary between the United States and Mexico is delineated by the Northern
International Boundary ("NIB") between California and Baja California until it meets
the Colorado River, where, for twenty-two miles the River forms the boundary (known
as the limitrophe), and meets the Southern International Boundary ("SIB"), the
boundary between Arizona and Sonora.
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was formed in 1995 in response to the critical habitat designation for
the Colorado pikeminnow, razorback sucker, bonytail, and humpback
chub in 1994' and the listing of the southwestern willow flycatcher as
endangered in 1995.'
The Bureau of Reclamation and the lower
Colorado River Basin states of California, Arizona, and Nevada began
negotiations over the development of a conservation plan and
incidental take permit application to obtain regulatory certainty for
continuing dam operations and water diversions. The Department of
Interior and Lower Basin states formalized their partnership with a
Memorandum of Agreement ("MOA") on August 2, 1995.174 The
intent of the MOA was to provide interim regulatory assurance during
a three-year program development period and long-term assurance
with the end conservation program, the MSCP.1 75 Instead of consulting
with FWS, who would develop a reasonable and prudent alternative
("RPA") to the agency's actions, (so that the Bureau could ensure its
activities did not jeopardize listed species), the signatories designed
the MOA to serve as the RPA, thereby postponing ESA section 7
consultation. 176 Conservationists threatened to sue the federal agencies
if the Bureau did not begin consultations with FWS as the ESA
required.177 In response, the federal and state agencies issued a
Memorandum of Clarification ("MOC") that ostensibly recognized
that the agencies participating in the MSCP could not avoid the legal
requirements of the ESA.7'T
The LCR MSCP is a partnership of state, federal, tribal, and other
public and private stakeholders with an interest in managing the water
and related resources of the Lower Colorado River Basin. The
purposes of the LCR MSCP are to:
(1) conserve habitat and work toward the recovery of threatened and
endangered species as well as reduce the likelihood of additional
species listings under the Federal Endangered Species Act ....

(2)

accommodate current water diversions and power production and

optimize opportunities for future water and power development...,
and (3) provide the basis for take authorization pursuant to

172. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Critical
Habitat for the Colorado River Endangered Fishes: Razorback Sucker, Colorado
Squawfish, Humpback Chub, and Bonytail Chub, 59 Fed. Reg. 13,374 (Mar. 21, 1994)
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). The Colorado squawfish has been renamed the
Colorado pikeminnow.
173. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants ; Final Rule Determining
Endangered Status for the Southwestern Willow Flycatcher, 60 Fed. Reg. 10,694 (Feb.
27, 1995) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
174. Memorandum of Agreement for Development of a Lower Colorado River
Species Conservation Program (Aug. 2, 1995) (on file with author).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See Letter from Gregory Sater, Defenders of Wildlife, to Bruce Babbitt,
Secretary, United States Department of the Interior et al., (Feb. 6, 1996) (outlining
the Bureau's attempts to avoid consultation and the agency's legal obligations under
the ESA) (on file with author).
178. Memorandum of Clarification (July 17, 1996) (on file with author).
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The overarching goal of the LCR MSCP is to provide long-term
compliance with the ESA for federal and non-federal entities for the
next fifty years.'80
There is, however, no representation of environmental and
Mexican interests because of the limited geographic scope. Despite
this, the MSCP is widely touted as an ecosystem approach to
conservation planning.' In late 1998, the Bureau of Reclamation had
supported a proposal to fund a study of conservation needs and
opportunities of the basin south of the Southern International
Boundary ("SIB") with Mexico." 2 The MSCP Steering Committee,
however, refused to agree to this proposal and instead limited the
geographic scope of the MSCP planning area to the river corridor
from Glen Canyon Dam to the SIB and restricted its binational
involvement to receiving progress reports on the Bureau's work in
Mexico.'
Conservationists felt that the MSCP's continued refusal to
adopt a conservation strategy that followed ecosystem boundaries, in
favor of a plan that left the status of Mexico and the delta in limbo,
would doom the effort to failure.'84 As a result, the last conservationists
on the MSCP steering committee, the Center for Biological Diversity
and Defenders of Wildlife, withdrew from the process.'85
Although the MSCP Steering Committee may have intended to
limit the scope of the MSCP in order to concentrate their efforts and
funds on a manageable project, the effect might be to compromise the
final product. For example, withdrawal of all four environmental
groups from the committee has raised questions about the adequacy of
representation and public participation in the MSCP. More recently,
questions have arisen regarding the MSCP's reliability, particularly
over the long-term, given that environmental impacts in Mexico have
not been addressed.
For example, after seeing that the MSCP would not effect, but

179. Department
of
the
Interior,
http://www.lcrmscp.org/noi-2000.html.

Bureau

of

Reclamation,

at

180. MULTI-SPECIES CONSERVATION PLAN, REVIEW DRAFr INTRODUCTION, PURPOSE AND
NEED, DESCRIPTION OF COVERED AcTIONs, EFFECr OF COVERED AcTIONs, AND No ACTION

ALTERNATIVE 3-5 (1999) (on file with author).

181. See Multi-Species Conservation Program (MSCP) for the Lower Colorado River,
Arizona, Nevada, and California, 64 Fed. Reg. 27,000 27,001 (May 18, 1999).
182. Facilitation Team Issue Paper Recommendation (Sept. 21, 1998) (on file with
author).
183. Lower Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation Program, Steering
Committee Meeting (Nov. 5, 1998) (on file with author).
184. See November 5, 1998 MSCP Steering Committee Meeting Notes, Comment,
Myopia on the Colorado,ARIZONA DAILYSTAR, Nov. 12, 1998, at 14Ao(on file with author).
185. See Letter from John Fritschie and David Hogan, Defenders of Wildlife and
Center for Biological Diversity, to Robert Johnson, Regional Director, Bureau of
Reclamation (Nov. 9, 1998) (on file with author); see also John Kostyack, Habitat
Conservation Planning: Time to Give Conservationistsand Other Concerned Citizens a Seat at
the Table, 14 ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE 51 (July-Aug. 1997).

Issue 2

WATERSHED MANAGEMENT 7VN
THE SOUTHWEST

could instead foreclose protection and restoration of the Colorado
River Delta, four non-governmental organizations from the United
States and four from Mexico challenged the adequacy of the ESA
consultation over the Bureau of Reclamation's operations and
maintenance of dams, reservoirs and water diversions along the Lower
Colorado River.1 6 The consultation did not fully consider the adverse
impacts to listed species that have some or all of their habitat in
Mexico, either in the Delta and/or Gulf of California. By excluding
species such as the totoaba, vaquita, Yuma clapper rail and
southwestern willow flycatcher from the consultation,P the Bureau has
hastened the demise of several endangered species. Whatever the
outcome of this litigation, it will have a profound effect on the scope
of future ESA consultations, and particularly the LCR MSCP, which is
still in development.
In addition to the outstanding issues of the Defenders of Wildlife
litigation, binational implementation of Minute 306 also implicates the
LCR MSCP. Not only are the two processes quite separate, but also
they are likely to remain so, given the inability (thus far) for the
Departments of State and Interior to reach a reciprocal working
relationship. Furthermore, the divergence of the two processes will
put one to the disadvantage of the other. The MSCP aims to lock in
river operation and management, and accompanying mitigation
measures, for the next fifty years. Non-federal entities in particular will
rely on the "no surprises" policy, which provides assurances to a permit
holder that no additional land use restrictions or compensation will be
required even if unforeseen circumstances indicate that additional
mitigation is required.88 As a result, MSCP members will resist any
additional mitigation requested via Minute 306.
On the other hand, in the interests of international diplomacy, the
Department of State, in one, five or twenty years, could impose a
bilateral agreement or new Treaty minute on United States interests. 8 9
In January 2000, the government of Mexico delivered a demarche,
accompanied by a diplomatic note, in which Mexico officially objected
to the adoption of the Interim Surplus Guidelines ("ISG") because it
186. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt, Civ. No. 00-1544 (D. D.C. filed June 28,
2000). At press this important case has been fully briefed on the merits and the judge
has heard oral argument.
187. See generally 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (2001); see also 60 Fed. Reg. 10,694 (Feb. 27, 1995)
(southwestern willow flycatcher); 51 Fed. Reg. 10,842 (Mar. 31, 1986) (desert pupfish);
50 Fed. Reg. 1056 (Jan. 9, 1985) (cochito); 44 Fed. Reg. 29,478 (May 21, 1979)
(totoaba); 32 Fed. Reg. 4001 (Mar. 11, 1967) (Yuma clapper rail).
188. See Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances ("No Surprises") Rule, 63 Fed. Reg.
8859 (Feb. 23, 1998) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). Just as the Secretary may
permit incidental takings by federal entities after section 7 consultation, the Secretary
may also issue incidental take permits to private parties under section 10. 16 U.S.C. §
1539(a) (2000). First, the parties must submit a habitat conservation plan ("HCP")
that specifies impacts, steps to minimize and mitigate impacts, any available funding,
and other necessary measures. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(A). Thus there will also be an HCP
component of the MSCP for non-federal interests.
189. In fact, the treaty itself, and Mexico's allocation, was finalized to the dismay of
the seven basin states. See Meyers & Noble, supranote 131, at 381-86.
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did not take into account or mitigate for the transboundary impacts
Mexico warned of, asked for postponement of the ISG to allow time
for bilateral consultations, and invited the United States government
to initiate diplomatic negotiations on the matter in order to prevent
any adverse transboundary impacts. 9" Mexico is also reported to have
filed an objection to the United States lining of the All-American
Canal, which will prevent seepage that currently recharges an aquifer
pumped by Mexicali Valley farmers. 9 ' The United States took eleven
months to respond to the demarche, and the Secretariat of
SEMARNAT, Victor Lichtinger, has stated that he is concerned about
the current method of allocating waters between the United States and
Mexico and that a primary issue of his agency will be to deal with water
supply and quality issues in Mexico. 92
Second, addressing the question of international instream flows is
made more difficult by the separation of these two processes. In
November of 1999, more than thirty-five non-governmental
organizations from Mexico and the United States sent a letter to both
governments urging them to establish international instream,
perennial flow rights in the Colorado River from the United States into
Mexico's Colorado River Delta and Upper Gulf of California, and
so.193
describing the treaties, laws and agreements relevant to doing
Establishing instream flow rights would require the United States to
deliver water to the border specifically for conservation purposes as
well as a joint commitment from Mexico to use this water for the
ecosystem.'
The Minute 306 process, without the LCR MSCP, will
have difficulty securing a source(s) for instream flows and a
mechanism for protecting that flow while instream. Therefore, recent
attempts to inject the idea or the principle into river management
have had to go through existing channels, and have been rebuffed. 95
190. See Semarnat, en desacuerdocon la decisidn unilateral:Afecta a Miico cambio de EU
en el manejo del rio Colorado, LAJORNADA, Jan. 24, 2001; Mexico Warns United States Over
Risks to River, REUTERS NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 7, 2001.
191. Haley Nolde, Fate of region high and dry after canalfix, SANJoSE MERCURY NEWS,
Dec. 17, 2000.
192. Carlos Reyes, Urgen Mexico y EU Aclarar Uso del Agua, EL NORTE, Feb. 23, 2001,
availableat http://www.elnorte.com/nacional/articulo/092521/.
193. Letter from Defenders of Wildlife et al., to Rosario Green, Minister of Foreign
Affairs; Arturo Herrera, Commissioner, CILA; Julia Carabias, Secretaria de Medio
Ambiente Recursos Naturales y Pesca (SEMARNAP); Comision Nacional del Agua
(CNA); Madeleine Albright, Secretary, U.S. Department of State; John Bernal,
Commissioner, IBWC; George Frampton, Chair, Council on Environmental Quality;
Bruce Babbitt, Secretary, U.S. Department of the Interior; William M. Daley, Secretary,
U.S. Department of Commerce; Carol Browner, Administrator, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (Nov. 24, 1999) (on file with author).
194. See Frank S. Wilson, A Fish Out of Water: A Proposalfor InternationalInstream Flow
Rights in the Lower ColoradoRiver, 5 COLO. J. INT'L ENVrL. L. POL'Y 249 (1994).
195. See BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
COLORADO RIVER INTERIM SURPLUS CRITERIA, vol. I, at 2-4 (2000) (rejecting Pacific
Institute surplus criteria alternative that would provide perennial base flows and
periodic flood flows to the Colorado River Delta); Courses Of Action Identified At The
Symposium On The Delta Of The Colorado River Held Sept. 11-12, 2001 (developed
by the Mexican delegation, proposing "[tihat both governments promise to provide

WATERSHED MANA GEMENT IN THE SOUTHWEST

Issue 2

It remains to be seen how successful independent efforts are.
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A. MIDDLE RIO GRANDE
The Middle Rio Grande Endangered Species Act Collaborative
Program ("Program") has roots similar to those of the LCR MSCP.
Through 1999, an informal group of federal, state, and environmental
representatives had been meeting to exchange information and
discuss ways of improving the river's environmental health. That year
also saw the designation of critical habitat for the silvery minnow,'97
severe minnow populations losses,'9 the suppression of an adverse
biological opinion on the Middle Rio Grande,'" and the subsequent
filing of a complaint challenging the failure of the federal agencies to
complete ESA consultation. 0 Realizing that all parties needed to take
a step forward with meaningful, coordinated action to save the
minnow, stakeholders from the federal, state, and city governments,
the
MRGCD,
and
the environmental
community inked
a
Memorandum of Understanding establishing the Program.'O
The
purpose of the Program is to protect and improve the status of
endangered
species, "while existing and future water uses are
20

protected."

1

The Program is still a work in progress, and of several issues

remaining, two have been alluded to already: tribal participation and
commitments for water. First, although no tribes or pueblos are
signatories to the MOU, representatives have attended several

Program meetings and have provided valuable input. However, recent
events may have strained the relationship between the Program and
volumes of water to protect and restore the ecosystems of the Delta.") (on file with
author).
196. See, e.g., Jo Clark et al., IMMEDIATE OPTIONS FOR AUGMENTING WATER FLOWS IN
THE

COLORADO

RIVER

DELTA

IN

MEXICO

(May

2001),

available

at

http://www.sonoran.org/pdf/ColoradoRiver.pdf (exploring sources of water in the
United States and Mexico for Delta restoration).
197. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife; Final Designation of Critical Habitat for
the Rio Grande Silvery Minnow, 64 Fed. Reg. 36,274 (July 6, 1999) (to be codified at
50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
198. Mike Taugher, Silvey Minnow Losses Send Biologists into Crisis Mode,
ALBUQUERQUE J., Nov. 11, 1999, at Al (asserting that the minnow was closer to
extinction than ever seen before).
199. Mike Taugher, Feds Ask Biologists to Redo River Report, ALBUQUERQUEJ., Nov. 3,
1999, at Al. The Fish and Wildlife Service had produced a draft biological opinion on
the effects of federal activities on the minnow and flycatcher, but did not release or
finalize it. Instead, they agreed to issue a new biological opinion, which was not
produced until June 29, 2001. See Letter from Regional Director, Region 2, to Area
Manager, Albuquerque Area Office, Bureau of Reclamation (June 29, 2001) (on file
with author).
200. Plaintiffs' Complaint, Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Martinez, Civ. No. 99-1320JP/KBM-ACE (D. N.M. filed Dec. 3, 1999). After the issuance of the June 2001
biological opinion, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint challenging the adequacy of
the consultation, particularly the scope of federal actions analyzed.
201. Memorandum of Understanding, Middle Rio Grande Endangered Species Act
Collaborative Program (Jan. 3, 2000) (on file with author).
202. Id.
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pueblos and tribes. During the fiscal year 2001 appropriations cycle,
the Senate made clear that future funding requests would have to
come through one collaborative group."3 Several parties interpreted
this as an ultimatum for tribal sovereigns (as well as other entities) to
become Program participants, or risk future funding for river
restoration initiatives.
This ultimatum relates to a more encompassing tensionperception that absence of tribal signatories hinders the Program's
progress. In addition to the underlying question of various parties'
commitments, there is a misconception that the need for governmentto-government consultation between the Indian governments and the
federal government is a barrier to the Program process.0 4 This can
hardly be true, since the Program still must settle critical substantive
issues and undergo NEPA and ESA compliance, among other things.
In addition, the consultation on the June 2001 biological opinion was
rushed, and not performed to the satisfaction of the pueblos.0 5 The
Department of the Interior would like to, and needs to, do a betterjob
this time.06 In the meantime, the process of requesting and funneling
money for ESA and restoration projects through the Program, with the
to break new ground, and
involvement of tribal entities, continues
2 17
hopefully, forge better relationships.
A second outstanding issue imperiling the Program's success is the
lack of commitment to securing water for the minnow. The lack of
quantification or proof of beneficial use by MRGCD, coupled with
allegations of wasteful water use, have targeted MRGCD as a logical
source of supplemental water. Because the Bureau and Corps manage
the river to supply the MRGCD, they too are under the microscope. A
crucial issue in the ongoing Rio Grande Silvery Minnow litigation is the
extent of federal control over the facilities (reservoirs, dams, etc.) in
the Middle Rio Grande, and the corresponding ability to use that
control for the benefit of endangered species. 28 Therefore, a program
203. See S. REP. No. 106-395, 95 (2000) (in appropriating funds to the Bureau of
Reclamation:
But more can and must be done to establish a single entity, reflecting the
range of interests, along the Rio Grande if the recovery effort is to be
successful and to ensure the efficient use of available resources. Further, a
single comprehensive group will ensure that activities undertaken are based
on sound science and contribute directly to silvery minnow recovery. Future
funding will be dependent upon a program plan for recovery activities that is
supported by State and local governments, Federal agencies, Tribes, and
water users.).
204. See Norman Gaume, Director, New Mexico Interstate Stream Commission
Presentationat the CLE InternationalLaw of the Rio GrandeConference, ENDANGERED SPECIES
Acr IN THE MIDDLE Rio GRANDE (Jan. 18, 2002) (presentation available in CLE
International Course Materials, Law of the Rio Grande) (on file with author).
205. ESA Work Group Meeting, at 9 (July 27, 2001).
206. ESA Work Group Meeting, at 7 (Aug. 3, 2001). The Bureau of Reclamation
and Corps of Engineers, as parties to the Program, must also consult.
207. See ESA Work Group Meeting, at 2-4 (Sept. 17, 2001) (devising ways to involve
the pueblos in the Program's fiscal year 2002 funding request).
208. See Plaintiffs' Opening Case Brief on Second Amended Complaint, Rio Grande
Silvery Minnow v. McDonald, Civ. No. 99-1320-JP/RLP-ACE (D. N.M. filed July 16,
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whose purposes are not only to protect imperiled species, but also to
recover these species, allows the Rio Grande to go dry-a serious threat
to silvery minnows.2 ° It is the hope of environmental representatives
that before the Program is finalized, there will be firm commitments to
supply water to the river to prevent its going dry.
VII. CONCLUSION
Even though these groups were formed to address one problem,
they still have difficulty overcoming the obstacles of a fragmented and
overlapping regulatory framework. Furthermore, and ironically, the
self-imposed, limited scopes of both programs are poised to cause the
delay that the participants had originally hoped to avoid. Challenges
like those of Indian water rights, the Colorado River delta, and the
definition and proof of beneficial use will require commitment by all
stakeholders in the river basin. If we are to learn anything from the
Law of the River(s), it is that there is no "permanent and definitive
solution0 10 when difficult questions are not addressed.
Put simply, the mere presence of these efforts, whether in response
to, or in anticipation of, a crisis is a start. Although problems such as
sufficient funding and equitable decisionmaking remain,' increased
interaction and openness will better frame the issues and solutions to
reach a broader spectrum of concerns and achieve lasting, though not
likely permanent, accord.

2001) (alleging that in issuing its biological opinion, FWS simply accepted the
Bureau's position on its discretion, and thus did not consult on the full range of
operations or consider the full spectrum of mitigation measures). Shortly before this
article went to press, Judge Parker issued a decision finding that the Bureau violated
the ESA by failing to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service about using water from
two federal reclamation projects. Rio Grand Silvery Minnow v. Keys, Civ. No. 99-1320
JP/RLP-ACE (D. N.M. April 19, 2002).
209. Associated Press, Draft Species Protection Plan Allows Dry Rio Grande at Times,
ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., Mar. 15, 2001.
210. Commentators often sarcastically refer to Minute 242 and the 1944 Water
Treaty, titled "The Permanent and Definitive Solution to the International Problem of
Salinity at the Colorado River," because it is hardly that.
211. Ann Brower et al., Consensus versus Conservation in the Upper ColoradoRiver Basin
Recovery ImplementationProgram,15 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1001 (2001).

